We study how risk-sensitive players act in situations where the outcome is influenced not only by the state-action profile but also by the distribution of it. In such interactive decision-making problems, the classical mean-field game framework does not apply. We depart from most of the mean-field games literature by presuming that a decision-maker may include its own-state distribution in its decision. This leads to the class of mean-field-type games. In mean-field-type situations, a single decisionmaker may have a big impact on the mean-field terms for which new type of optimality equations are derived. We establish a finite dimensional stochastic maximum principle for mean-field-type games where the drift functions have a p-norm structure which weaken the classical Lipschitz and differentiability assumptions. Sufficient optimality equations are established via Dynamic Programming Principle but in infinite dimension. Using de Finetti-Hewitt-Savage theorem, we show that a propagation of chaos property with virtual particles holds for the non-linear McKeanVlasov dynami1cs.
Introduction
Recently, there has been a renewed interest in optimization and game problems of mean-field type, where the performance functionals, drifts, diffusions, and jump coefficients depend not only on the state and the control but also on the probability distribution of state-control pair. Most formulations of mean-field type optimization in [5, 6, 8, 13, 16, 27] have been of risk-neutral type where the performance functionals are the expected values of stage-additive cost functions of Bolza or Mayer type. Not all behavior, however, can be captured by riskneutral mean-field type optimizations. One way of capturing risk-averse and risk-seeking behaviors is by exponentiating the performance functional before expectation (see [14] ). The objective of a risk-sensitive player is then to optimize an exponentiated long-term loss. The risk-sensitive criterion is related to the robust control via relative entropic measures. As the risk-sensitive parameters vanish, one gets a risk-neutral maximum principle of mean-field-type.
On Mean-Field Games
There are several pioneer works on static and/or stationary mean-field games. Most of them are under different names such as global games, anonymous games, aggregative games, population games, large games, etc, but share lot of common features. Here we limit ourselves to the some pioneer works on dynamic mean-field games. One of the first works on mean-field games is [1] . Therein, the author proposes a game-theoretic model that explains why smaller firms grow faster and are more likely to fail than larger firms in large economies. The game is played over a discrete time space. The mean-field is the aggregate demand/supply which generates a price dynamics. The price moves forwardly, and the players react to the price and generate a demand and the firm a supply with associated cost, which regenerates the next price and so on. The author introduced a system of backward-forward system to find equilibria (see for example Section 4, equation D.1 and D.2 in [1] ). The backward equilibrium equation is obtained as an optimality to the individual response, i.e., the value function associated with the best response to price, and the forward equation for the evolution of price. Therein, the consistency check is about the mean-field of equilibrium actions (population or mass of actions), that is, the equilibrium price solves a fixed-point system: the price regenerated after the reaction of the players through their individual best-responses should be consistent with the price they responded to. Following that analogy, a more general framework was developed in [2] , where the mean-field equilibrium is introduced in the content of Markovian dynamic games with large number of decision-makers. A mean-field equilibrium is defined in page 4 of [2] by two conditions: (i) each generic player's action is best-response to the mean-field, and (ii) the mean-field is consistent and is exactly reproduced from the reactions of the players. This matching argument was widely used in the literature as it can be interpreted as a generic player reacting to an evolving mean-field object and at the same time the mean-field is formed from the contributions of all the players. The authors of [39] show that show how common noise can be introduced into the mean-field game model (so the mean-field distribution evolves stochastically) and extend the Jovanovic-Rosenthal existence theorem. The methodology developed in [1] and the subsequent series of papers [2, 39, 40, 41, 43, 44] share the following assumptions:
• (Big size) There is a large number of decision-makers, sometimes, infinite, or a continuum of decision-makers.
• (Anonymity) The index of the decision-maker does not affect the utility.
• (NonAtomicity) A single decision-maker has a negligible effect on the mean-field-term and on the utility.
Unfortunately, some of the above conditions appear to be very restrictive in terms of applications, and we explain below how to relax them via mean-fieldtype game theory. [21] is fundamentally different than the present work. Therein, the mean-field term is frozen to be the equilibrium mean-field term and a single decision-maker cannot influence the mean-field-term. In the present work, we shall show that, when a single decision-maker has a non-negligible effect in the mean-field, the fundamental optimality equations are changed. In [24] we have analyzed risksensitive linear-exponentiated quadratic games of mean-field-type for which we have provided closed-form expressions using a novel risk-sensitive stochastic maximum principle derived in [22] which does not use the value function. It allows us, in particular, to work with the SMP equations in situations where the value function is not necessarily differentiable.
Substantial progress have been done in the last decade in mean-field games in the non-cooperative setup. However, very little is known about cooperative mean-field games. In [36] we have introduced cooperative mean-field type games in which the state dynamics and the payoffs depend not only on the state and actions but also on their probability measure. We establish a time-dependent payoff allocation procedure for coalitions of mean-field type. The allocated payoff considers not only fairness property but also the cost of making the coalition. Both time consistency and subgame perfectness solution concept equations are established.
Mean-field-type games: additional features
Risk-sensitive mean-field-type games [42] are fundamentally different than risksensitive mean-field games. In the mean-field game-theoretic models it is usually assumed that (i) very large number of players, (ii) players are indistinguishability (in the sense of the strategies, payoffs, state laws), (iii) individual contribution to the mean-field term is assumed to be negligible. In mean-field-type games, none of the assumptions (i)-(iii) is needed. Following [36] , a mean-field-type game is defined as any game in which the payoff and/or state dynamics involve not only the state and action profiles and also the distribution of the sate-action pair (or its marginals such as distribution of states and distribution of actions). Mean-field-type game theory is suitable for one, two or more players. A typical example is, a single decision-maker with mean-variance payoff. In mean-fieldtype games: (i) a single player can have a big influence on the mean-field term. A typical example is an Air Conditioning system which tries to reduce the variance of the temperature state with the respect the desired comfort temperature of the user. That the context, there is only one decision-maker, the user, who acts on the controller. The control variable is between {Heating, Cooling, N othing}. Clearly, the control action has significant impact on the variance of the temperature. (ii) there is no need for players to be indistinguishable (see Section 3). (iii) there is no need to have large number (or infinite or continuum) of players. The mean-field-type game framework allows us to address more interesting realworld applications where the number of decision-makers may be large but still finite and include both von Neumann and non-von Neumann utility functions.
Novelty and Contribution
Our contribution can be summarized as follows. We start with one player risksensitive mean-field-type optimization where the state dynamics has L p −norm structure, which is not differentiable. Our main motivation for considering this structure comes from its applications for the control of virus spread among interactive communities (networks) as observed in [25] . This allows us to consider other types of non-linear mean-field interactions that are not investigated in the literature of mean-field games. It also allow us to consider weakened Lipschitz conditions and non-differentiable drift coefficients. We show that the nondifferentiability issue can be handled using weak derivatives or sub-differential set. We derive a stochastic maximum principle and a dual game variable which satisfies the risk-sensitive SMP whenever the associates weak derivatives make sense. In addition, a risk-sensitive DPP is provided in infinite dimension. We believe that the present paper is the first work that analyzes risk-sensitive meanfield-type games with the L p −norm which is non-differentiable.
Structure of the paper
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the model and state the main results for one player. Section 3 presents risk-sensitive mean-field type games with two or more players. We provide a dynamic programming principle in infinite dimension in subSection 3.2. Section 4 focuses on the control of virus spread among interactive communities (networks). Section 5 concludes the paper. For completeness, we provide in Appendix the de Finetti-HewittSavage theorem and the existence and uniqueness proofs.
To streamline the presentation, we only consider the one-dimensional state case. The extension to the multidimensional case is by now straightforward. The norm is denoted with the index α ≥ 1 and p will be used for the adjoint process in the stochastic maximum principle. Also, it should be noted that our diffusion coefficient is control independent. More general state, control and mean-field dependent diffusions are carried out in [22] . Also the technique developed here can be easily extended to the jump-diffusion case using the works in [10, 12, 11] .
2 Mean-field-type game with one risk-sensitive decision-maker Let T > 0 be a fixed time horizon, α ≥ 1 and (Ω, F , lF, lP) be a given filtered probability space on which a one-dimensional standard Brownian motion B = {B s } s≥0 is given, and the filtration lF = {F s , 0 ≤ s ≤ T } is the natural filtration of B augmented by lP−null sets of F . We consider the following risk-sensitive problem :
where the state space is X = R, the termb is distribution-dependent and has the special structurē
i.e., the L α −norm of b with the respect to the measure m u (t, .).
Notice that for α > 1 the drift termb is non-linear in the measure m.
is the probability law of the random variable x u (t). The parameter θ is the risk-sensitivity index of the player. The instantaneous cost function is
and the terminal cost function is
The control strategy u is chosen by the decision-maker. An admissible control strategy u is an lF-adapted and L α * -integrable process with values in a nonempty subset U of lR d . We denote the set of all admissible strategies of the player by U. Definition 1. A mean-field-type game is a game in which the payoff and/or state dynamics involve not only the state-action profiles and also the distribution of the sate-action pair (or its marginals such as distribution of states and distribution of actions). Example 1. Problem (1) is a mean-field-type game with one decision-maker. The optimality equation of (1) is a nonstandard system from mean-field-type optimal control [28] .
Given an admissible strategy u ∈ U of the decision-maker (player), the state equation in (1) is a measure-dependent stochastic differential equation (SDE) with random coefficients.
In view of (1), up to a change of the parameter θ into −θ, the optimization ofJ θ is the same as the following optimization problem
Anyū(·) ∈ U satisfying
is called a risk-sensitive optimal strategy. The corresponding state process, solution of the SDE in (1), is denoted byx(·) := xū(·). The mean-field-type optimization problem that we are interested in, is to characterize the pair (x,ū) solution of the problem (1) .
. Then the risk sensitive loss functional is given bȳ
When the risk-sensitive index θ is small, the loss functionalJ θ can be expanded as
where, var(Ψ T ) denotes the variance of Ψ T . If θ < 0 , the variance of Ψ T , as a measure of risk, improves the performance, in which case the optimizer is called risk seeker. But, when θ > 0, the variance of Ψ T worsens the performanceJ θ , in which case the optimizer is called risk averse. The risk-neutral loss functional E[Ψ T ] can be seen as a limit of risk-sensitive functionalJ θ when θ → 0. This is one of the reasons why this criterion attracted lots of attention. The criterion has also interesting connections with H ∞ −mean-field-type optimization. This is easily viewed from the Donsker-Varadhan formula:
for any measurable bounded function φ on Ω, and ν a probability measure on Ω. Moreover, the supremum is uniquely achieved by the imitative BoltzmannGibbs distribution µ * widely used in distributed strategic learning [26] ,
The functionH(.|.) is the relative entropy from Ω toR given bỹ
whenever µ ∈ P(Ω) is absolutely continuous with the respect to ν, otherwise we setH(µ|ν) = +∞. The problem is
Existence of solution to the state equation
We now focus on the well-posedness of the state dynamics. and then, the SDE in (1) admits a unique strong solution
where x i,n (t) a i−th particle state solution of
andx i,n (t) has the law of x u (t).
Proof. See Appendix.
As we provide in Theorem 1 in Appendix, the mean-field convergence of the empirical measure
is by now a well-established result under de Finetti-Hewitt-Savage theorem. The issue here is to identify the limiting measure m with the particularity of the L α −norm structure. We provide an example of mean-field-type SDE in cooperative dynamics.
Example 2 (Effect of mean-field in cooperative dynamics). Consider the meanfield stochastic dynamics with drift
where µ > 0, and constant diffusion coefficient σ ∈ R. The first term in the drift (sin(−x 3 (t) + x(t))) is often replaced by a control action u(t) ∈ [−1, 1] to get
This type of mean-field SDE models has been used to understand muscle contraction (see Section 5 in [23] ). Other similar models have been widely studied in chemical kinetics, statistical mechanics and economics to capture cooperative behavior of a generic particle, oscillator or an agent.
Note that the presence of the measures m u (s), 0 ≤ s ≤ T , in the loss function J θ may cause time-inconsistency, in which case the Bellman's Principle with the state x is no longer valid and this motivates the use of the stochastic maximum principle (SMP) approach to a get a finite dimensional framework. Note, however that, one can apply DPP where the state in infinite dimension µ(t, .) as shown in Section 3.2 (see also [37] ).
Stochastic Maximum Principle
We define the risk-neutral Hamiltonian associated with random variables
We also introduce the risk-sensitive Hamiltonian: for θ ∈ lR and (p, q, ℓ) ∈ lR × lR × lR,
We have H = H 0 . The sign (−f ) is used here for the only purpose of having maximum principle instead of minimum principle and does not fundamentally change the methodology. Moreover, we denote
for k ∈ {x, m}. Note that even if b is differentiable, the drift coefficientb which is
may not be differentiable at the points where b(.) = 0. Denote bȳ
The case whereb α−1 (x, m) < 0 is handled in a similar way. The differentiation with the respect to the measure m is considered in a Gateauxderivative sense as in [28] .
Example 3. We provide Gateaux differentiation of x α −based functions:
The Gateaux-derivative with the respect to m is f m (.,
• Square of the mean:
g m (., t, x, m)(ξ) = ξm. Hence, g m (., t, ξ, m)(x) = xm, and ∂ x g m (., t,X, m)(x) = m.
• Second moment: If g(., t, x, m) = 1 2
• α−th moment:
• α−norm: g(., t, x, m) = ( |y| α m(t, dy))
. We differentiate with the respect to x to get:
where the notationẼ denotes the expectation with the respect to the variables withX which is an copy of X. We now replace the argument x by
We now introduce the first order adjoint processes involved in the risksensitive SMP. The (risk-sensitive) first order adjoint equation is the following backward SDE of mean-field type:
where,
Note that the Hamiltonian terms in (12) are evaluated at the optimal state and optimal control (x(·),ū(·)), i.e., H θ k (t,x(t),m(t),ū(t),p(t),q(t), ℓ(t)), k ∈ {x, m}.
Lemma 1 ( [9, 8] ). Consider the following mean-field backward SDE
where p(T ) is a progressively measurable, square integrable random variable. Let f (t, ., ., ., .) be Lipschitz for all time t ∈ [0, T ] and t → f (t, 0, 0, 0, 0) be square integrable over [0, T ]. Then, the mean-field backward SDE has a unique adapted solution satisfying
Note that, by choosingf (t,p(t),q(t), p(t), q(t)) = a 0 (t, .)+a 1 (t, .)p(t)+a 2 (t, .)q(t)+ a 3 (t, .)p + a 4 (t, .)q(t) where a i (t, .) are measurable bounded coefficient functions, one gets a backward equation in the form of the adjoint equations.
Proposition 2. If the functions b, σ, f, h, are twice continuously differentiable with respect to (x, m) and b, σ, f, h and all their first order derivatives with respect to (x, m) are continuous in (x, m, u), and bounded then (12) admits an
In addition, if b > 0 then (12) admits a unique lF-adapted solution.
Proof. Under the assumptions of Proposition 2, the processes p, q solve a backward SDE coupled with the process v θ . Moreover, these equations can be transformed into linear SDEs of mean-field-type, which involves (p, q,
, l). We now check that the coefficients of the linear SDEs does not blow-up within the horizon [0, T ]. For the functions σ, f, h, and their derivatives the boundedness follow from the assumption. However, it is not immediate for the drift coefficientb . We recall that b x ,b m ,b xm are not clearly defined at the point where b(., t, x, .) is zero. Since α ≥ 1, we replace these terms by any representation in the sub-differential set. All terms are bounded by M = sup t∈[0,T ] sup |b x (t, .)|. The process v θ (t) is almost surely bounded. Then, for each direction chosen in the sub-differential, the assumptions of Lemma 1 are fulfilled and hence, the existence of solution to the first order risk-sensitive adjoint equations follows. Moreover, if b > 0 then the denominator does not vanish andb x and ∂ xbm are (uniquely) well-defined, and bounded by M. Using Lemma 1 again we get existence and uniqueness of solution.
Note that the boundedness and differentiation conditions can be weaken by using the techniques developed in [7, 15] . The following Proposition is the stochastic maximum principle for Problem (1). 
for almost every t ∈ [0, T ] and P−almost surely.
Proof. To prove the SMP, we use a logarithmic transformation and follows similar steps as in [22] .
Below we provide an explicit representation of the process of the SMP via a dual approach and partial differential equations of mean-field type.
3
Mean-Field-Type Games: two or more risksensitive players
We now consider two or more risk-sensitive players. The risk-sensitivity index of player i is θ i . The best response to u −i , m is the following problem :
where
and by abuse of notation, u = (u i , u −i ). Note that we cannot impose indistinguishability of the players since θ i and the objectives f i , h i may be different across the players.
Main Result
We now present the key results of the paper. The risk-sensitive game with cost J θ i solves a system of risk-sensitive HJB equations
which is a partial differential equation with state µ (in infinite dimension). If we denote v * i (t, x, z) := V i,µ (t, µ)(t, x, z) as a dual function (because of the Gateaux derivative with the respect to µ) then (v * 1 , . . . , v * n ) is in finite dimension and solves the dual system
where H i is the Hamiltonian, u i ∈ arg min H i ,w = (x,z), and m(t, x) = µ(t, x, dz 1 . . . dz n ), and µ(t, .) solves the Kolmogorov equation in which u is replaced by the optimal strategies (u 1 , u 2 , . . . , u n ). Then (p * i , q * i , η * i , l i ) solves the (risk-sensitive) stochastic maximum principle system given by:
where, φ
Dynamic programming for risk-sensitive mean-fieldtype games
We establish a dynamic programming principle in infinite dimension. We first write the objectives as a function of the infinite dimensional state µ which satisfies the Fokker-Planck-Kolmogorov forward equation
with the initial distribution µ(0, dx, dz) = m 0 (dx)δ 0 (dz). The advantage now is that µ(.) is a deterministic object the cost can be rewritten in a deterministic manner as
This a terminal cost in the sense it is evaluated only at µ(T, .). Since there is no running cost, one can write directly the HJB equation using classical calculus of variations for
starting from µ(t, .) at time t :
As we can see, the required working state for player i is (x, z i ), therefore the partial derivatives of V i with respect to z are only considered for z i . The risksensitive HJB minimum principle yields
This is an infinite dimensional PDE on (t, µ). Below we provide a simpler optimality equation (i.e., the state will be in finite dimension) by setting
Differentiating (25) with the respect to µ one gets
is called Dual Function associated with the best response value of player i. (18) where the state is now reduced to (x, z) which is in finite dimension.
Below we show that if there exists a dual function (in the sense of weak derivatives) then its weak derivatives provide a risk-sensitive SMP.
Dual functions associated with the best response values
In a risk-neutral setting, Bensoussan et al. have established in [28] a partial differential equation as a necessary condition for optimality under smoothness assumption. We apply the methodology to the risk-sensitive case. The basic idea consists to write the optimality inequality as
By introducing the auxiliary state z such that dz i = f i (.) dt, z i (0) = 0, the risk-sensitive game problem is transformed into mean-field-type game problem without running cost. The terminal cost is e θi[zi(T )+hi(x(T ),m(T ))] . Since the state is augmented to be (x, z), the first order adjoint process becomes (p 1i
Let v * i (t, x, z) be the dual function defined above, satisfying (18) where µ = L(x u (t), z u (t)), the x−marginal is m(t, .) = µ(t, ., dz) and
The terminal condition is
and H i,u = 0 for interior optimal control u. Let v i be a function in the Lebesgue space L 1 (I), with I = [a, b] a compact interval of R, a < b. We say that w ∈ L 1 (I) is a "weak derivative" of v if,
for all infinitely differentiable functions ϕ with ϕ(a) = ϕ(b) = 0. Equation (18) is an interesting partial differential equation. Indeed, if there is a solution v * (t, x, z) to (18) that is three times weakly differentiable then the partial weak derivatives of v * (t, x, z) solves the risk-sensitive SMP (12). Below we identify explicitly the processes solution to the risk-sensitive SMP.
∂z Vi,µ(t,x u (t),z u (t)) where the derivatives are taken in a distribution sense (weak derivative). Then the process p * evaluated at the optimal trajectory solves the backward SDE:
where 
Proof. By Ito's formula, we have
From (18) it is clear that the partial (weak) derivative of the integral term with the respect to z is zero (because it does not depend on z). We differentiate (18) to get
which means that the drift term is v *
Lets compute the diffusion coefficient more explicitly:
Hence, one gets
Proposition 5. The function (η * 1 , . . . , η * n ) solves the partial differential equation:
whenever these derivatives make sense. Moreover η * i has a constant sign and has the same sign as θ i .
Proof. This follows from a weak derivative with the respect to z i in Eq. (18) .
Note that the function m in Proposition 5 is the marginal of µ with the respect to x and µ solves the Fokker-Planck-Kolmogorov forward equation with drifts (b, f ) and diffusion coefficient (σ, 0) : 
θi , θ i l * i ) solves the risk-sensitive SMP (12) and dp
(T ))(x(T )) e θi(zi(T )+hi(x(T ),m(T )))
The function v * (t, .) = ∂ µ V is not the value function in the sense of Bellman because of the presence of the term E[H i,m ] in Eq. (18) . v * (t, .) is the adjoint function (dual function) associated to mean-field-type best-response problem. Interestingly, in the mean-field free case, i.e., when h i,m = 0, f i,m = 0, b i,m = 0, the dual function (v
Virus Spread over an evolving network
WiFi network security has gained significant attention in research and industrial communities as a result of the global connectivity provided by the Internet. This has led to a variety of traditional defense mechanisms ranging from cryptography, firewalls, antivirus software, to intrusion detection systems. Table 1 displays a sample number of network attacks by major geographic region (State or Country) with more than 100 000 attacks. See [38] for more details on real time web attack monitoring.
A virus that spreads through WiFi networks as effectively as a human cold moves through cities, airports, public transport areas has been explored recently. The virus can travel between WiFi networks via Access Points (APs) that connect households and businesses to WiFi networks. It can also propagate through femto cell and small cell networks. We denote by x the state of the entire network. x could represent the number of access points that can be reached with infected relays (hotspots) at a specific period of the day. Since the number of access points that are active is highly stochastic and the number of nodes in the network is time-varying, x is a random process. We do not consider a mass-action principle because there is no conservation of mass in this case, the population itself is random. It is unclear that the random process can be driven by Brownian but here we assume a small noise effect for simplicity. Users move over several geographical areas and some of them may carry portable wifi access points. Thus, the network is mobile and random. Each access point may interact with other hotspots in a certain neighborhood of communication and then the information/host propagates over multiple hops. In this setting an increasing rate is observed within the last decade. To capture this phenomenon, we propose an L α −norm drift model for the rate [46] . The control parameter u 1 of the attacker may represent for example the rate at which the virus attempts transmission over the access points.
State dynamics models
With explosive growth of mobile devices and the internet of things (IoT), there is an increasing number of vulnerable devices and machines connected to these networks and hotspots so that the mass is not conserved. The population has a tendency the growth (in expectation). To Illustrate this we consider an information propagation model where the state is given by Figure 1 represents the evolution of the state under different noises. In Figure 1 the parameters are κ = 10, K = 2, and σ ∈ {0, 1} and different noise terms are plotted. Starting from a initial state value x(0) = 0.3, we observe that the population state has tendency to move around 2 within the time interval [0, 1].
The state needs to be controlled
Due to the presence of malicious attack in the network, there are lot of security, privacy concerns so that the state needs to be controlled [3] . To illustrate the model we introduce an attacker and a defender. Each of them has a control parameter, and has to make a certain decision on those parameters.
u 1 is the attacker control strategy and u 2 is the defender control strategy. In Figure 2 we represent the case where a significant control effort e = u 2 −u 1 = 0.3 is injected into the system. We observe that the control affects significantly the state dynamics and help towards a certain goal. For a significant effort Add noise using σ h 1/2 W Uncontrolled State Dynamics e = u 2 − u 1 = 0.3 invested into security, the state of infection can stay below the level 2 starting from level 1. This means that control helps to reduce the infection rate and improve security. However, the location of mobile devices and WiFi hotspots may be important in some cases, specially when local interaction and communications arise. In order to capture this phenomenon we introduce a non-linear behavior via the geographical location distribution and the intensity of interaction at time t as m(t, dy) and we introduce b(t, x, y, u 1 , u 2 ) = y[γ(x) + u 1 − u 2 ], and the state dynamics becomes
The variable y can be seen as the intensity of interaction of infected devices/hosts. As we can see in Figure 3 , the mean-field term [ y y α m(t, dy)] 1 α x, with α = 1.2. We observe that the infection state is significantly reduced compared to the open-loop case of Figure 3 . This is illustrated in Figure 5 for several initial states. Hence, it is important to strategically control the mean-field term so that the infected machines remains limited and the damage minimized. In order to do such a minimization we introduce below some objective functions. 
Objectives
In the context of delay/disruption tolerant networks it can be shown that the delay and the probability of receiving the information have a natural risk-sensitive structure via Poisson arrival rates. However, the attacker and the network defense may not have the same sensitivity when facing the risk. We denote by θ 1 = θ a the attacker risk-sensitivity index and by θ 2 = θ d the defender risk in-dex. The cost of the attacker is f 1 (x, m, u 1 , u 2 ) = The cost of the defender (could be the system administrator) is decomposed into damage cost and security investment loss is
The control variables are limited to the interval [0, 1] at any time and the diffusion coefficient is systemsize dependent: σ n(t) := σ n(t) where n(t) is a random variable representing the (active) system size at t. Since there are multiple defense strategies, here we do pull them together in a cooperative manner as an ideal target. However, as observed in practice, the defender may not coordinate their defense strategies due to non-alignment of objectives and/or professional privacy issues. Figure 6 represents a typical instantatenous cost. In Figure 7 we plotted the evolution of a typical cost (random) invested into security over time.
These functions are not bounded, and we cannot use directly the existence results established above. However, we provide the optimality equation for the interior case and derive a risk-sensitive SMP. max(0, a) ). The defender's optimal strategy is
where p 1 , p 2 , solve the risk-sensitive SMP system :
Backward-Forward System
We investigate (35) numerically under stochastic Euler scheme (also called Euler-Maruyama scheme). We choose α = 1.2. We set θ 1 = 0.1, θ 2 = 0.3, c 1 = 0.8 =c 1 .The initial distribution is concentrated around two points: 1 and 2. This can be extended to capture a geographical area where the attacks are concentrated in two main countries. In Figure 8 , we plot the state distribution over time, the initial and final distribution, and the evolution of the expected values. We observe that the distribution moves progressively towards higher states.
Concluding remarks
In this paper we have studied mean-field-type games with a drift that has L α −norm structure. Although this norm is not differentiable, it is possible to get existence of solutions. We have established relationship between the risksensitive SMP and the dual functions. This allow us to verify the risk-sensitive SMP equations. When, the drift is mean-field free, we retrieve the classical risk-sensitive equations. The work can be extended in several ways. First, the interaction model in the drift b(t, x, y, u) (which is pairwise interaction) can be modified to include k−wise interaction in the form b(t, x, y 1 , . . . , y k , u) with the measure k l=1 m(t, dy l ). This is, in particular, useful for the control of virus spread over network where the interaction involves multiple nodes at a time. Second, the explicit solutions or qualitative analysis of SMP need to be conducted. Third, when α < 1, we do not have a norm and the triangular inequality does not hold. In that case, quasi-norm type of inequalities need to established. We leave these open issues for future research.
A.1 Indistinguishability
The notion of indistinguishability (or exchangeability or interchangeability) is introduced in order to discuss the existence of a limiting measure and mean-field convergence of the empirical measure of virtual particle states in the framework of de Finetti-Hewitt-Savage [31, 32, 29, 33, 34] .
Let X be a separable complete and metrizable topological space (Polish space). A collection (x (1) , x (2) , . . . , x (n) ) of X −valued random variables/processes, is indistinguishable (or exchangeable) if the joint law is invariant by permutation over the index set {1, . . . , n}, i.e., for any permutation σ over the set {1, 2, . . . , n}, one has
Definition 3 (Indistinguishability).
where L(X) denotes the law of the random variable X. An infinite family of random variables/processes (x (1) , x (2) , . . .) is indistinguishable if every finite n, the family (
This says that the order (position) of the random variable in the family does not change the joint distribution. From (36) we also have that, for any measurable operator O,
where we do not permute the last component. For indistinguishable random variables/ processes, the convergence of the empirical measure m n := 1 n n i=1 δ x (i) has been widely studied. This sits at the intersection between group theory and probability theory. The symmetry group properties have been used to derive some properties of the distributions of the processes. The de Finetti-Hewitt-Savage theory provides the mean-field convergence of such a measure-valued process. When studying convergence of measures, an important issue is the choice of probability metric. In order to measure the gap between two probability measures, we introduce the Wasserstein (Vasershtein) metric (also called Monge-Kantorovich metric) d α of order α ≥ 1.
where γ x denotes the marginal with the respect to the x−component, where d 0 is a reference metric on X (such a metric exists because X is assumed to be metrizable).
The famous Kantorovich-Rubinstein 1958 theorem gives a dual representation of d 1 in terms of a Lipschitz-Bounded metric:
is the Lipschitz-norm of φ. It can be shown that d α is a metric (a "true" distance in a topological sense), i.e., it satisfies the axioms of a metric. For Polish spaces X , the Wasserstein distance d 1 is known to metrize the weak topology over X . As stated in Villani's book [35] the Wasserstein distance has the following properties: for any 1 ≤ α < +∞,
• m n converges to m in distribution (weak convergence of probability measures) i.e.,
as n → +∞, for any measurable bounded and Lipschitz functions φ.
• d α 0 (x, y)m n (dy) < +∞ for some x ∈ X . Thanks to these nice properties, the Wasserstein distance d α is an appropriate candidate for the convergence of the empirical measure in the weak sense.
Theorem 1 (de Finetti-Hewitt-Savage). Let x (1) , x (2) , . . . , be an indistinguishable sequence of X −valued random variables, where X is a Polish space. Then, there is a P(X )−valued random measure m such that
where P(X ) denotes the space of probability measures on X . Conditioned on m, the random variables x (1) , x (2) , . . . are i.i.d with distribution m, that is, for each measurable bounded function φ,
In addition, if the moments of x (i) are finite then
where C 1 > 0 and d = d 1 denotes the Wasserstein metric of order one.
Note that the convergence in Theorem 1 is in the weak sense since the MongeKantorovich distance d 1 metrizes the weak topology. Theorem 1 has been proved by de Finetti (1931, [31] ) for infinite binary sequences and has been extended by Hewitt and Savage (1955, [32] ) to continuous and compact state spaces. A simple and elegant proof can be found in Aldous (1985, [29] ), pp. 18-22, for the general state space. The rate of convergence for Monge-Kantorovich distance is obtained following the line of the law of large numbers of interacting systems. Theorem 1 was initially used for static (time-independent) maps. Then, several applications in mathematical physics and biology, with dynamical models came into the picture. These are dynamically interacting particles, genes, molecules or nodes. Theorem 1 was then extended to the dynamical case in at least two ways: (i) path wise (up to a certain time step T ), (ii) at each time step t.
A.2 Large Deviation Principle for m n
We say that for any time t, the probability measures (m n (t)) n≥0 on a topological space obeys a Large Deviation Principle with rate functions (I(t, .)) and in the scale (a n ) n if (a n ) n is a real-valued sequence satisfying a n → ∞ and I is a non-negative, lower semicontinuous function such that
for any measurable set B, whose interior is denoted by int(B) and closure by cl(B). If the level sets {x : I(t, x) ≤ β} are compact for every β < +∞, I(t, .) is called a good rate function. We introduceH(.|.) as the relative entropy function (defined also above)H
if µ is absolutely continuous with the respect to ν and +∞ otherwise. The main advantage of having this type of result is the decay of m n (t, B) as n gets large. Basically, when the two limits are identical, m n (t, B) is the order of e −anR where R = inf x∈B I(t, x) > 0. As a consequence, the weak convergence from Theorem 1 and central limit theorems can be derived from these inequalities.
The next result provides a large deviation principle result [35] .
Theorem 2. Assume that initially m n (0) follows a large deviation principle with rate I(0, m(0)) on the set of probability measures P(X ). 
We now prove Theorem 1 in several steps:
A.3 Existence of solution to the state equation
We start with the existence of solution. To prove existence of a solution with the respect to the Wasserstein distance, we adopt a contraction-type of approach. Then, we construct a Cauchy sequence (L α space which is a Polish space). Consequently, the solution is almost unique. Consider the SDE given by
Then one gets a fixed-point stochastic
Then, by induction,
where C T = 2Le 2LT , and where we have used the Lipschitz continuity L of b and the Minkowski inequality for p ≥ 1. By summing up over natural numbers k, one gets k≥k0 D t,α L k+1 (µ 0 ), L k (µ 0 ) < +∞. Thus, (L k (µ 0 )) k≥k0 , is a Cauchy sequence with the respect to the metric D T,α , for k 0 ≥ 1. Since we are in a complete metric space, this sequence converges to some fixed-point (say, m). 
The first term I 1 (see (40) ) deals only with i.i.d random variables. Therefore, the convergence for that part is classical. For the second term I 2 , we use the triangular inequality for α ≥ 1. By Lipschitz continuity of b , we get |I 2 | ≤ This result shows that when α ≥ 1, and when the initial distributions of the virtual particles are mutually independent, with same distribution as x(0), then the particle interaction model with fixed control u soon destroys that independence through the empirical measure m n . But, for a given finite time t, when the number of particle becomes large, the mean-field convergence implies that the distributions become approximately independent again conditioning on m(t, .), so that independence is still retained. This is called propagation-of-chaos. Note that this result is limited to finite horizon. For long-term behavior one needs to study the asymptotics (infinite horizon in time) of the SDEs in order to derive propagation (or non-propagation) of chaos property. 
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